TLS front door (Caddy) for this repo's own services: one hostname, a permanent
HTTP->HTTPS redirect, and the API on the same origin as the page. Home Assistant,
Grocy, Frigate and the rest keep their own ports — fronting HA brings its own
auth and websocket concerns and none of the problems below need it.
Three concrete reasons, not hygiene:
1. The admin panel's URL carries IDENTITY_TOKEN, which grants administrative
access to the person registry AND to the device grants that decide whether a
smart lock opens. On plain HTTP that is readable by anything on the smart-home
VLAN — a segment deliberately full of cheap IoT hardware.
2. getUserMedia requires a secure context, so register.html's camera cannot work
over http://192.168.x.x at all. It also failed SILENTLY: the call site used
`navigator.mediaDevices?.getUserMedia(...).then().catch()`, and optional
chaining short-circuits the whole chain — so neither handler ran, no "Camera
unavailable" message appeared, and registration proceeded photo-less with no
explanation. Verified in node. register.js now checks explicitly and says
which of the two cases it is; HTTPS is what actually fixes it.
3. Serving the page over HTTPS while ?api= still pointed at http://...:8097 would
have every call blocked as mixed content, so the API has to be proxied too.
tls: internal runs Caddy's own CA (no external dependency, works with no WAN at
all) with tools/export-proxy-ca.sh to fetch the root; tls: custom takes an
existing cert, which is how you'd use a real one from a DNS-01 challenge without
exposing anything. HSTS is deliberately not set — with an internal CA it would
turn a dismissible warning into a hard failure. Kiosks stay on plain HTTP for
now: a full-screen cert interstitial is not dismissible on a device with no
keyboard, so moving them is documented as a follow-up rather than done blind.
Empty service tokens now fill themselves in on the first build and land in
tokens.txt with what each is for. They are written BACK to the config, which is
the part that matters: a token is only useful because two machines agree on it,
so generating fresh randomness per build would produce a door panel that cannot
talk to the service it was built for. Blanks are filled once and never
overwritten. ha_token, mqtt_password, admin_password_hash and ssh_authorized_key
are deliberately not invented — tokens.txt lists them with the reason, so an
empty field is never a mystery.
32 new checks: token generation and stability across runs, disabled services
skipped, tokens.txt contents, config still valid after the rewrite, Caddyfile
routes and redirect, conditional pantry route, both TLS modes, and that the
derived admin URL keeps page and API on one origin. Nothing has been run against
a real Caddy — see proxy/README.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the oldest deferred item in the plan (open decision #22). /presence has
reported a best-effort `room` since Phase 6, but there was nothing to plot it
on: no floor plan, no room list, no coordinate format. The reason it stayed
deferred was sound — nothing here knows the shape of this flat, and inventing a
coordinate format against a guess would have been the wrong kind of work. So the
plan is DRAWN, by hand, in a new Floorplan tab.
Levels hold rooms; rooms are polygons (real rooms aren't rectangles) with an
optional background image to trace over. Click corners to draw, drag handles to
adjust. Each room maps to the HA area string /presence already reported, and the
editor offers a pick-list of the areas HA is actually reporting rather than
asking anyone to retype an area_id from Developer Tools — same anti-typo
reasoning as CoreSystemConfig.json. Tick "Show who's home" and occupied rooms
light up.
Coordinates are normalised 0-1 rather than pixels: the plan has to render on a
laptop now and possibly a wall panel later, and pixels would be right on exactly
one of them. The tradeoff is documented — replacing a background with one of a
different aspect ratio distorts existing rooms.
Two choices about failure worth calling out. A room with no HA area is legal and
labelled as such on the plan, because drawing the flat and wiring up presence are
separate jobs. And anyone who can't be placed — home with no room resolved, or
reporting an area no room claims — is listed under the plan, with unclaimed areas
named so you know what's left to draw. A floor plan that quietly lost people
would be worse than no floor plan.
The whole feature is still gated on AREA_ATTRIBUTE being right, which remains an
unconfirmed guess at what Bermuda publishes; every room can be drawn correctly
and still never light up. The editor makes that diagnosable rather than
mysterious, but can't fix it. Added to identity's verification list.
38 backend checks: level and room CRUD, polygon validation (too few points, out
of range, non-numeric, over the vertex cap), duplicate-area refusal, image
round-trip, the presence join including both unplaceable cases, area suggestions
degrading when HA is down, and cascade on level delete. The editor UI itself has
not been opened in a browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rides the same arrival transition the visit log is built from, so "arrived" has
exactly one definition in this service rather than two that could disagree.
- notify_on_arrival (default off) is the "if enabled" half: push me when someone
gets home. announce_arrivals (default ON) is a separate per-person opt-OUT of
being announced, for anyone who doesn't want their comings and goings
broadcast. The asymmetry is deliberate — if both defaulted off, ticking
"notify me" would look broken until everyone else opted in too.
- Per-person notify_topic falling back to NTFY_DEFAULT_TOPIC. Topics are
deduplicated, or a five-person household sharing one topic would get five
identical pushes per arrival. The arriver is never told about themselves;
subscribers who are away still are, since that's most of the point.
- The first sample after startup notifies nobody and establishes a baseline
instead — otherwise a restart after a gap would fire "X just got home" for
everyone already on the sofa. Costs one missed notification in that window.
- Face-recognition arrivals say "was just recognised at home", not "just got
home" — the signals aren't equally reliable and the reader should know which.
- Pushes are sent outside _db_lock and isolated from each other, so a hanging
ntfy can't stall request handling and one bad push can't swallow the rest.
- POST /people/<id>/test-notification, because the alternative way to find a
typo'd topic is to wait for someone to walk in and notice nothing happened.
identity itself never touches the WAN — it POSTs to the ntfy already in this
stack. Whether the push reaches a phone that's AWAY is a network question, and
docs/network-integration.md's existing answer (WireGuard in, never a
port-forward) applies unchanged; iOS can't do this locally at all, since ntfy's
iOS app needs APNs and therefore an upstream relay. Documented as a table.
Also fixes two pre-existing bugs found while wiring this up: chores' template
pointed IDENTITY_URL and NTFY_URL at 127.0.0.1, which inside that container is
the container itself. chores would have reached neither identity nor ntfy, and
done nothing at all — silently, since both paths fail soft by design. Deployed
chores.env files still carry the old values and need editing by hand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extends Phase 6's identity rather than adding a service — all of this is facts
about who someone is, already identity's job.
- admin.html/admin.js: manage people/guests, edit every field, prune, history,
access log. Deliberately not kiosk-shaped and not linked from any wall panel —
a panel anyone can walk up to shouldn't carry a "prune these people" button.
- Nicknames are an input alias only. /resolve accepts them; every payload also
carries speak_name (always the real name) and chores/ uses it for reminders.
A nickname colliding with anyone's name or nickname is refused; a spoken string
matching two people refuses with ambiguous_name rather than picking one.
- Visit history sampled from identity's own /presence. home:null writes nothing,
ever — an HA outage must not record a departure that didn't happen. Departures
need sustained absence (BLE flaps) and are stamped at the last time actually
seen. "With whom" is an interval-overlap query, not a second table.
- Pruning splits selecting from deleting: the filter fills the checkboxes, the
delete goes by explicit id, and the filter is never re-run at delete time.
- Device rights are an answer, never an action — identity stores grants and
answers GET /device-access; HA asks and HA acts. Deny is the default and the
only fallback. Grants can expire; every check is logged, denials included.
- Chore assignment prefers an assignee who's home but doesn't let an absent one
block the chore (CHORE_ASSIGNMENT_STRICT flips that). Litter still ignores
both exemption and assignment.
- Admin-added identifiers still enforce TRUSTED_ENTITY_PREFIXES; only the
"in range right now" check is relaxed, never the allowlist.
Resolves open decision #26; adds #34-37 for the new unknowns (DEPARTURE_GRACE_
SECONDS is untuned, the panel has never been opened in a browser).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
identity/ (Phase 6, rewritten from the original Node-RED sketch): a
person <-> BLE-identifier registry built directly as a Python service.
Solves multi-phone (multiple identifiers per person), anti-spoofing
(only allowlisted IRK-resolved/fixed-tag entities are ever accepted as
registration candidates, never a raw or randomized MAC), device-less
people (a grandmother without a smartphone gets a no_device registration
plus a hand-operated home/away toggle, reported as "unknown" rather than
a false "away"), and anonymous guests (POST /register/guest, no name
needed). Every person gets an automatic profile picture from their most
recent registration photo. /presence also reports a best-effort room per
person as groundwork for an eventual floor-plan view (not built).
Registration is single-utterance voice ("register me as <name>") or a
touchscreen form; ambiguous/conflicting candidates never auto-commit.
hosts/door-panel/ (Phase 18, new host): structurally kitchen-display's
twin - one Sway workspace, one Chromium kiosk window - defaulting to
identity's weather+clothing/who's-home/groceries-running-low dashboard,
with voice registration as its actual purpose (mic on by default, unlike
every other host's opt-in).
hosts/kitchen-display/: adds opt-in voice satellite and a "Show
registration" screen pointed at identity's register.html, reusing the
same camera-equipped-endpoint registration flow.
pantry-vision/: adds GET /shopping-list (Grocy's own volatile/missing
products, reshaped) for the door panel's "running low" section.
setup-container-host.sh: wires ENABLE_IDENTITY (identity + identity-web,
published like pantry-vision since kiosk browsers call it directly, plus
a persistent SQLite/photos volume unlike pantry-vision's stateless
design) and fixes the HA_URL example to the host's real LAN IP (HA runs
network_mode: host, unreachable by container name - the same situation
Node-RED's own config already documents).
docs/: Phase 6 rewritten, Phase 18 added, hardware/software/guardrail/
open-decision entries throughout project-plan.md and README.md.
components.md gains RuView presence nodes (one per room), fixed BLE tags,
and 2 spare webcams, with the price estimate updated to match.
Nothing here has been run against real hardware, a real HA instance, or
real Private BLE Device entities - TRUSTED_ENTITY_PREFIXES above all
needs checking against a live instance before registration finds
anything. See identity/README.md and hosts/door-panel/README.md for the
itemized verification lists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K6CrKjW3yVptUnjG35HjC1