Dotfiles/docs/md/freeipa-ansible.md

# FreeIPA & Ansible

The FreeIPA/Ansible system provides centralised identity management for a fleet of Arch Linux machines: single sign-on, host-group-driven package and module deployment, policy enforcement, LUKS backup key collection, scan-result aggregation, and automatic Keycloak configuration.

All relevant files live under `setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/`.

---

## Architecture

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  FreeIPA + Keycloak + Samba container (docker-compose)               │
│                                                                      │
│  • FreeIPA — user/host directory, Kerberos KDC, DNS (optional)       │
│  • Keycloak — OIDC provider federating FreeIPA via LDAP              │
│  • Samba — two SMB shares for scan results and LUKS backup keys      │
│  • cronie — hourly scan-result analyser (ansipa-check-scans)         │
└───────────┬─────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘
            │ SSSD / Kerberos         │ SMB (445)
            ▼                         ▼
┌──────────────────────┐    ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Enrolled client     │    │  Ansible controller                     │
│                      │    │                                         │
│  • sssd              │    │  • deploy-ansipa-*.yml playbooks        │
│  • ipa CLI           │    │  • collect-luks-keys.yml                │
│  • Ansible-deployed  │    │    (uploads keys to ansipa-luks-keys    │
│    timers:           │    │     share as luks-upload service acct)  │
│    ├── pkg installer │    └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
│    ├── module install│
│    ├── Flatpak install
│    ├── baseuser sync │
│    └── policy enforcer (every 30 min)
│        ├── binary blocking
│        ├── daemon enable/disable
│        ├── Timeshift backups
│        ├── security scans + SMB upload
│        └── alert fetch + desktop notify
└──────────────────────┘
```

---

## FreeIPA Server Container

### Quick Start

```bash
cd setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/image
cp .env.example .env
$EDITOR .env                        # set all required variables
docker compose up -d
docker compose logs -f freeipa      # watch first-boot (~10 min)
# Once freeipa is healthy:
./keycloak-configure.sh             # wire Keycloak → FreeIPA LDAP
```

To run FreeIPA without Keycloak:

```bash
docker compose up -d freeipa
```

### Environment Variables (`.env`)

| Variable | Required | Description |
|----------|----------|-------------|
| `IPA_HOSTNAME` | yes | FQDN of the IPA server (e.g. `ipa.corp.example.com`) |
| `IPA_DOMAIN` | yes | DNS domain (e.g. `corp.example.com`) |
| `IPA_REALM` | — | Kerberos realm; defaults to `IPA_DOMAIN` uppercased |
| `IPA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | yes | `admin` account password |
| `IPA_DM_PASSWORD` | yes | Directory Manager password |
| `IPA_SETUP_DNS` | — | `true` to enable integrated DNS (default `false`) |
| `IPA_DNS_FORWARDER` | — | Upstream DNS when `IPA_SETUP_DNS=true` |
| `IPA_SETUP_KRA` | — | `true` to enable the Key Recovery Authority |
| `SMB_SCAN_PASSWORD` | yes | Password for the `scanupload` Samba service account |
| `LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD` | yes | Password for the `luks-upload` Samba service account |
| `KC_HOSTNAME` | yes | Public hostname of Keycloak |
| `KC_REALM` | — | Keycloak realm name (default `corp`) |
| `KC_ADMIN` | — | Keycloak admin username (default `admin`) |
| `KC_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | yes | Keycloak admin password |
| `KC_DB_PASSWORD` | yes | PostgreSQL password for Keycloak |
| `IPA_BIND_DN` | — | LDAP bind DN for Keycloak federation (default: Directory Manager) |
| `IPA_BIND_PASSWORD` | — | LDAP bind password; leave blank to reuse `IPA_DM_PASSWORD` |
| `IPA_USE_LDAPS` | — | `true` to use LDAPS for Keycloak federation |

### Exposed Ports

| Port | Protocol | Service |
|------|----------|---------|
| 389 | TCP | LDAP |
| 636 | TCP | LDAPS |
| 88 | TCP + UDP | Kerberos |
| 464 | TCP + UDP | kpasswd |
| 443 | TCP | HTTPS (IPA web UI) |
| 445 | TCP | SMB (Samba shares) |
| 139 | TCP | NetBIOS session (Samba) |
| 137 | UDP | NetBIOS name service |
| 138 | UDP | NetBIOS datagram |
| 8080 | TCP | Keycloak HTTP |
| 8443 | TCP | Keycloak HTTPS |

### Container Internals

On first start, `ipa-first-boot.service` runs `ipa-first-boot.sh` to initialise the FreeIPA instance. On every start, `ansipa-smb.service` runs `ansipa-smb-setup.sh` to configure Samba (the container rootfs is ephemeral — Samba config and users must be re-applied after restarts).

Data persisted to the `/data` volume:

```
/data/
├── samba/
│   ├── passdb.tdb          # Samba password database (survives restarts)
│   └── ansipa-smb.env      # Persisted SMB passwords (auto-written on first start)
├── scan-results/
│   ├── archive/<host>/     # Client scan logs (written by clients via SMB)
│   └── alerts/<host>/      # Alert files generated by ansipa-check-scans (hourly)
└── luks-keys/              # LUKS backup keys (written by Ansible controller via SMB)
```

---

## SMB Shares

The container exposes two Samba shares, both configured by `ansipa-smb-setup.sh`.

### `ansipa-scans` — Scan Result Archive

- **Path:** `/data/scan-results`
- **Authenticated user:** `scanupload` (write-only; no browse)
- **Purpose:** Clients enrolled in `policy-security-scan` upload their daily ClamAV / rkhunter / chkrootkit logs here after each scan run.
- **Analysis:** `ansipa-check-scans.sh` runs hourly via cronie; it reads each host's archive logs and writes `*.alert` files to the `alerts/` subdirectory when concerning patterns are found.
- **Credentials file on clients:** `/etc/ansipa-smb.creds` (deployed by `deploy-ansipa-policies.yml`)

### `ansipa-luks-keys` — LUKS Backup Key Store

- **Path:** `/data/luks-keys`
- **Permissions:** write-only for `luks-upload`; read-only for members of the `KeyAdmin` Linux group
- **Purpose:** The Ansible controller writes each host's LUKS backup key here after collecting it via `collect-luks-keys.yml`.
- **Access control:** Add an admin Samba user to the `KeyAdmin` group on the container:
  ```bash
  # On the freeipa container
  useradd -r -G KeyAdmin <username>
  smbpasswd -a <username>
  ```
  The `KeyAdmin` group and the `luks-upload` / `scanupload` service accounts are created by `ansipa-smb-setup.sh` on every container start.

---

## Client Enrollment

### Via Installer Module

Select `freeipa-client` during `tui-install.sh` or `install-modules.sh`.

### Manual Enrollment

Three modes:

```bash
# Answerfile mode (unattended)
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh \
    --answerfile setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client-answerfile.json

# Interactive prompts
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh --interactive

# Direct flag passthrough to freeipa-enroll.sh
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh \
    --domain freeipa.example.com \
    --server ipa.example.com \
    --principal admin
```

### Client Answerfile Schema

```json
{
  "domain":      "freeipa.abdelbaki.eu",
  "realm":       "FREEIPA.ABDELBAKI.EU",
  "server":      "freeipa.abdelbaki.eu",
  "hostname":    "",
  "principal":   "admin",
  "password":    "",
  "mkhomedir":   true,
  "sudo":        true,
  "dns_update":  true,
  "ntp_server":  "",
  "fido2":       false,
  "fido2_users": []
}
```

Leave `hostname` blank to use the current machine hostname. Leave `password` blank to be prompted at enrollment time.

---

## Ansible Playbooks

All playbooks live in `setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/ansible/` and require an inventory of enrolled IPA clients.

### Deploy Package Auto-Installer

```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-install.yml
```

Deploys `ansipa-install-packages.sh` + a systemd timer (every 30 min). The script queries IPA for host groups named `ansipa-install-<package>` and installs or removes packages to match.

**Group naming convention:** `ansipa-install-firefox` → installs `firefox`.

### Deploy Module Auto-Installer

```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-modules.yml \
    [-e ansipa_user=amir]
```

Deploys `ansipa-install-modules.sh` + timer. Queries for groups named `ansipa-module-<name>` and runs the matching script from `/usr/local/lib/ansipa-modules/<name>.sh`. Module scripts are copied from `setup/modules/optional-Modules/apps/*.sh`.

Each module is applied once and stamped in `/var/lib/ansipa-modules/<name>.done`.

### Deploy BaseUser Sync

```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-baseuser-sync.yml
```

Deploys a `systemd.path` unit that triggers on login. Users who are members of the IPA `BaseUser` group are automatically added to the local `baseusers` group.

### Deploy Policy Enforcer

```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-policies.yml \
    -e smb_scan_password=<SMB_SCAN_PASSWORD>
```

Deploys `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`, `ansipa-fetch-alerts.sh`, `ansipa-scan-notify.sh`, a systemd timer (every 30 min), and `/etc/ansipa-smb.creds`. Use `ansible-vault` for the password in production.

### Collect LUKS Backup Keys

```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory collect-luks-keys.yml \
    -e luks_smb_server=ipa.corp.example.com \
    -e luks_upload_password=<LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD>
```

For each enrolled host:
1. Fetches `/_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY` from the client to a local staging directory.
2. Uploads the staged key to `//ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys/<hostname>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY` via `smbclient` using a temporary credentials file (`no_log`, deleted in `post_tasks`).
3. Removes the local staging copy after a successful upload.

Keys on the SMB share are accessible only to `KeyAdmin` group members (see [SMB Shares](#smb-shares)).

**Schedule automatic collection:**

```bash
# Add to crontab on the Ansible controller
0 3 * * * cd /path/to/FreeipaAnsible/ansible && \
    ansible-playbook -i inventory collect-luks-keys.yml \
    -e luks_smb_server=ipa.corp.example.com \
    -e luks_upload_password=<LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD>
```

---

## Host Group Reference

### Device policies (host groups — applied machine-wide)

| Group prefix | Handled by | Effect |
|--------------|-----------|--------|
| `ansipa-install-<pkg>` | `ansipa-install-packages.sh` | Install/remove native package |
| `ansipa-module-<name>` | `ansipa-install-modules.sh` | Run module script once |
| `fp_install-<app>` | `ansipa-install-flatpaks.sh` | Install Flatpak app |
| `BaseUser` | `auto-add-baseuser.sh` | Add user to local `baseusers` group |
| `policy-daemon-enable-<unit>` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | `systemctl enable --now <unit>`; reverted on leave |
| `policy-daemon-disable-<unit>` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | `systemctl disable --now <unit>`; reverted on leave |
| `policy-timeshift-backup` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Daily Timeshift snapshot at 03:00 |
| `policy-security-scan` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Daily ClamAV + rkhunter + chkrootkit scan + SMB upload |
| `policy-scan-notify` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Fetch server alerts, notify user every 10 min until acknowledged |
| `no_local_users` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Lock passwords for root and all local users (UID ≥ 1000); reverted on leave |
| `local_sudo_<username>` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Grant `<username>` full sudo on this specific device; reverted on leave |

### User policies (user groups — follow the user across all enrolled devices)

| Group prefix | Handled by | Effect |
|--------------|-----------|--------|
| `policy-block-binary-<name>` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Prevent group members from running `<name>` on any enrolled host; use `__` for `.` in Flatpak app IDs |

---

## Policy Enforcement

`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` runs every 30 minutes on each enrolled client (deployed by `deploy-ansipa-policies.yml`). All policies are idempotent and reversible — leaving a host group undoes the policy on the next run.

### Binary Blocking (per user)

`policy-block-binary-<name>` is a FreeIPA **user group**, not a host group. Membership follows the user to every enrolled machine: a blocked user cannot run `<name>` regardless of which device they log into.

The enforcer queries all `policy-block-binary-*` user groups from FreeIPA on every run and installs a **PATH-priority wrapper** in `/usr/local/bin/<name>` for each one. The wrapper checks the caller's group membership at runtime via `id(1)` / SSSD and:
- **blocks** the command if the caller is a group member (exits 1 with a policy message);
- **passes through** to the real binary for all other users (searches native PATH dirs, then falls back to `flatpak run <name>`).

**Flatpak support:** use `__` in place of `.` in the group name. For example, `policy-block-binary-org__gimp__Gimp` blocks the Flatpak `org.gimp.Gimp` for group members while transparently invoking `flatpak run org.gimp.Gimp` for everyone else.

Deleting the IPA user group causes the wrapper to be removed on the next enforcer run. State is tracked in `/var/lib/ansipa-policies/blocked-binaries`.

### Daemon Enable / Disable

| Group | Effect on join | Effect on leave |
|-------|---------------|-----------------|
| `policy-daemon-enable-<unit>` | `systemctl enable --now <unit>` | `systemctl disable --now <unit>` |
| `policy-daemon-disable-<unit>` | `systemctl disable --now <unit>` | `systemctl enable --now <unit>` |

The `.service` suffix is optional — it is appended automatically when the unit name contains no dot, so any systemd unit type works. If a unit appears in both enable and disable groups simultaneously, it is skipped with a warning.

State is tracked in `/var/lib/ansipa-policies/daemon-enabled` and `daemon-disabled` so revert actions are applied correctly when a host leaves a group.

### Security Scans & Alert Pipeline

```
Client (policy-security-scan)
  └── daily 02:00: clamscan + rkhunter + chkrootkit
       └── smbclient → //ipa-server/ansipa-scans/archive/<host>/<date>.log

IPA container (hourly cron)
  └── ansipa-check-scans.sh
       └── grep for FOUND / Warning / Possible rootkit / etc.
            └── writes /data/scan-results/alerts/<host>/<date>.alert

Client (policy-scan-notify, every 10 min via systemd timer)
  └── ansipa-fetch-alerts.sh (root)
       └── downloads *.alert files → ~/administration/<host>/ per active user
            └── ansipa-scan-notify.sh (user daemon, started on login via profile.d)
                 └── notify-send every 10 min while *.alert files remain
                      └── delete file to acknowledge → removed from server on next fetch
```

**Prerequisites for scan policies:**
- Add host to `ansipa-module-anti-malware` before `policy-security-scan` (installs ClamAV, rkhunter, chkrootkit).
- `samba-client` is installed automatically by `deploy-ansipa-policies.yml`.
- SMB credentials are written to `/etc/ansipa-smb.creds` (root-only, `0600`).

### Local User Lockdown

Adding a host to the `no_local_users` group locks the password of every local account — root (UID 0) and all regular users (UID ≥ 1000) — using `passwd -l`. Accounts whose passwords are already locked (`!` or `*` prefix in shadow) are left untouched and are not tracked.

State is persisted in `/var/lib/ansipa-policies/no-local-users` (one username per line). Only accounts that were actively unlocked at apply time are written to this file, so the revert step only unlocks what was changed.

| Action | Effect |
|--------|--------|
| Join `no_local_users` | `passwd -l` on root + all UID ≥ 1000 local accounts |
| Leave `no_local_users` | `passwd -u` on every account listed in the state file |

**Interaction with FreeIPA sudo:** Domain accounts in the `sudoers` or `sudo-nopasswd` FreeIPA groups retain full sudo access via SSSD — local password lockdown does not affect them. Ensure at least one domain admin has sudo before adding a host to this group.

### Per-device sudo grants

`local_sudo_<username>` is a **host group** that grants a specific user full sudo on that particular machine, independently of FreeIPA-wide sudo rules. This is useful for giving a user admin rights on their own workstation while keeping them unprivileged on shared servers.

| Action | Effect |
|--------|--------|
| Join `local_sudo_alice` | Creates `/etc/sudoers.d/ansipa-local-sudo-alice` with `alice ALL=(ALL) ALL` |
| Leave `local_sudo_alice` | Removes the drop-in on the next enforcer run |

State is tracked in `/var/lib/ansipa-policies/local-sudo-users`. Drop-ins are mode `0440` and validated by `visudo` syntax rules automatically.

---

## LUKS Key Flow

```
  Install time (arch-autoinstall.sh or archbaseos-guided-install.sh)
  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  1. User sets primary LUKS passphrase interactively
  2. 64-byte random key generated from /dev/urandom
  3. Key enrolled in second LUKS slot
  4. Key written to /_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY (mode 0400, root-only)
     inside the encrypted Btrfs volume

  Post-install (Ansible controller)
  ──────────────────────────────────
  5. collect-luks-keys.yml runs
  6. Fetches /_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY from each client (become: yes)
  7. Uploads to //ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys/<host>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY
     as 'luks-upload' service account (write-only, no_log)
  8. Local staging copy deleted after successful upload

  Recovery (KeyAdmin member)
  ───────────────────────────
  9. Connect to //ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys with a KeyAdmin Samba account
  10. Retrieve <host>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY and use with cryptsetup
```

The backup key lives inside the encrypted partition and is only accessible when the disk is already unlocked. Its purpose is to allow an admin to unlock the disk for recovery without knowing the user's passphrase.

---

## Keycloak

`keycloak-configure.sh` performs the initial wiring after both FreeIPA and Keycloak containers are healthy:

1. Creates the configured realm in Keycloak.
2. Sets up an LDAP federation pointing at the FreeIPA LDAP/LDAPS endpoint.
3. Configures user and group mappers.

Run it once after the first `docker compose up`:

```bash
cd setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/image
./keycloak-configure.sh
```

The Keycloak admin console is available at `http://<KC_HOSTNAME>:8080` (dev mode) or `https://<KC_HOSTNAME>:8443` (requires TLS cert for production `start` command).

---

## Auto Enrollment + Ansible

```bash
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/auto-enroll-ansible.sh
```

Combines FreeIPA client enrollment and Ansible deployment in one shot. Useful for provisioning scripts that run on first boot.