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# FreeIPA & Ansible
The FreeIPA/Ansible system ("ansipa") provides centralised identity management for a mixed Linux fleet (Arch, Fedora, RHEL/Rocky/AlmaLinux, Debian/Ubuntu): single sign-on, host-group-driven package and module deployment, policy enforcement, CheckMK monitoring, LUKS backup key collection, scan-result aggregation, and automatic Keycloak configuration. For a full deployment walkthrough — ports, the nginx portal/reverse proxy, firewall rules, NAT behaviour, and Proxmox LXC — see the [ansipa Setup Guide](ansipa-setup.md).
All relevant files live under `setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/`.
---
## Architecture
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ FreeIPA + Keycloak + Samba container (docker-compose) │
│ │
│ • FreeIPA — user/host directory, Kerberos KDC, DNS (optional) │
│ • Keycloak — OIDC provider federating FreeIPA via LDAP │
│ • CheckMK — fleet monitoring (agent + local checks) │
│ • Samba — SMB shares for the policy store and LUKS backup keys │
└───────────┬─────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘
│ SSSD / Kerberos │ SMB (445)
▼ ▼
┌──────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Enrolled client │ │ Ansible controller │
│ │ │ │
│ • sssd │ │ • deploy-ansipa-*.yml playbooks │
│ • ipa CLI │ │ • collect-luks-keys.yml │
│ • CheckMK agent │ │ (uploads keys to ansipa-luks-keys │
│ • Ansible-deployed │ │ share as luks-upload service acct) │
│ timers: │ └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ ├── pkg installer │
│ ├── module install│
│ ├── Flatpak install
│ ├── baseuser sync │
│ └── policy enforcer (every 30 min)
│ ├── binary blocking
│ ├── daemon enable/disable
│ ├── Timeshift backups
│ └── dev_mon_clamscan → CheckMK
└──────────────────────┘
```
---
## FreeIPA Server Container
### Quick Start
```bash
cd setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/image
cp .env.example .env
$EDITOR .env # set all required variables
docker compose up -d
docker compose logs -f freeipa # watch first-boot (~10 min)
# Once freeipa is healthy:
./keycloak-configure.sh # wire Keycloak → FreeIPA LDAP
```
To run FreeIPA without Keycloak:
```bash
docker compose up -d freeipa
```
### Environment Variables (`.env`)
| Variable | Required | Description |
|----------|----------|-------------|
| `IPA_HOSTNAME` | yes | FQDN of the IPA server (e.g. `ipa.corp.example.com`) |
| `IPA_DOMAIN` | yes | DNS domain (e.g. `corp.example.com`) |
| `IPA_REALM` | — | Kerberos realm; defaults to `IPA_DOMAIN` uppercased |
| `IPA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | yes | `admin` account password |
| `IPA_DM_PASSWORD` | yes | Directory Manager password |
| `IPA_SETUP_DNS` | — | `true` to enable integrated DNS (default `false`) |
| `IPA_DNS_FORWARDER` | — | Upstream DNS when `IPA_SETUP_DNS=true` |
| `IPA_SETUP_KRA` | — | `true` to enable the Key Recovery Authority |
| `LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD` | yes | Password for the `luks-upload` Samba service account |
| `KC_HOSTNAME` | yes | Public hostname of Keycloak |
| `KC_REALM` | — | Keycloak realm name (default `corp`) |
| `KC_ADMIN` | — | Keycloak admin username (default `admin`) |
| `KC_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | yes | Keycloak admin password |
| `KC_DB_PASSWORD` | yes | PostgreSQL password for Keycloak |
| `IPA_BIND_DN` | — | LDAP bind DN for Keycloak federation (default: Directory Manager) |
| `IPA_BIND_PASSWORD` | — | LDAP bind password; leave blank to reuse `IPA_DM_PASSWORD` |
| `IPA_USE_LDAPS` | — | `true` to use LDAPS for Keycloak federation |
### Exposed Ports
| Port | Protocol | Service |
|------|----------|---------|
| 389 | TCP | LDAP |
| 636 | TCP | LDAPS |
| 88 | TCP + UDP | Kerberos |
| 464 | TCP + UDP | kpasswd |
| 443 | TCP | HTTPS (IPA web UI) |
| 445 | TCP | SMB (Samba shares) |
| 139 | TCP | NetBIOS session (Samba) |
| 137 | UDP | NetBIOS name service |
| 138 | UDP | NetBIOS datagram |
| 8080 | TCP | Keycloak HTTP |
| 8443 | TCP | Keycloak HTTPS |
| 8090 | TCP | CheckMK web UI (container :5000) |
| 8000 | TCP | CheckMK agent receiver (push mode) |
| 6557 | TCP | CheckMK livestatus (optional) |
| 8088 | TCP | nginx gateway — portal + reverse proxy for all UIs |
> For a full deployment walkthrough — the nginx portal, exposing ansipa behind
> your own reverse proxy, and NAT/push-mode behaviour — see the
> [ansipa Setup Guide](ansipa-setup.md).
### Container Internals
On first start, `ipa-first-boot.service` runs `ipa-first-boot.sh` to initialise the FreeIPA instance. On every start, `ansipa-smb.service` runs `ansipa-smb-setup.sh` to configure Samba (the container rootfs is ephemeral — Samba config and users must be re-applied after restarts).
Data persisted to the `/data` volume:
```
/data/
├── samba/
│ ├── passdb.tdb # Samba password database (survives restarts)
│ └── ansipa-smb.env # Persisted service passwords (auto-written on first start)
├── policy-store/ # Policy files, edited live via the ansipa-policystore share
└── luks-keys/ # LUKS backup keys (written by Ansible controller via SMB)
```
---
## SMB Shares
The container exposes two Samba shares (`ansipa-luks-keys` and
`ansipa-policystore`), configured by `ansipa-smb-setup.sh`.
> ClamAV scan results are **no longer** delivered over SMB. The `dev_mon_clamscan`
> policy now reports them to CheckMK via a local check (`Ansipa_ClamScan`), so
> there is no `ansipa-scans` share or `scanupload` account any more.
### `ansipa-luks-keys` — LUKS Backup Key Store
- **Path:** `/data/luks-keys`
- **Permissions:** write-only for `luks-upload`; read-only for members of the `KeyAdmin` Linux group
- **Purpose:** The Ansible controller writes each host's LUKS backup key here after collecting it via `collect-luks-keys.yml`.
- **Access control:** Add an admin Samba user to the `KeyAdmin` group on the container:
```bash
# On the freeipa container
useradd -r -G KeyAdmin <username>
smbpasswd -a <username>
```
The `KeyAdmin` group and the `luks-upload` service account are created by `ansipa-smb-setup.sh` on every container start.
---
## Client Enrollment
`freeipa-enroll.sh` supports **Arch, Fedora, RHEL/Rocky/AlmaLinux, and
Debian/Ubuntu** — it auto-detects the distro and uses the right package manager
and package names. On Arch, `ipa-client-install` comes from the AUR
`freeipa-client` package; the enroll script first builds the bundled
`autofs-pkgbuild/` (the stock AUR `autofs` is currently broken — its pinned
tarball 404s), so expect the first Arch enrollment to take a while as the AUR
FreeIPA suite compiles. See the [ansipa Setup Guide](ansipa-setup.md#arch-caveat--autofs--freeipa-client-from-the-aur)
for details.
### Via Installer Module
Select `freeipa-client` during `tui-install.sh` or `install-modules.sh`.
### Manual Enrollment
Three modes:
```bash
# Answerfile mode (unattended)
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh \
--answerfile setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client-answerfile.json
# Interactive prompts
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh --interactive
# Direct flag passthrough to freeipa-enroll.sh
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh \
--domain freeipa.example.com \
--server ipa.example.com \
--principal admin
```
### Client Answerfile Schema
```json
{
"domain": "freeipa.abdelbaki.eu",
"realm": "FREEIPA.ABDELBAKI.EU",
"server": "freeipa.abdelbaki.eu",
"hostname": "",
"principal": "admin",
"password": "",
"mkhomedir": true,
"sudo": true,
"dns_update": true,
"ntp_server": "",
"fido2": false,
"fido2_users": []
}
```
Leave `hostname` blank to use the current machine hostname. Leave `password` blank to be prompted at enrollment time.
---
## Ansible Playbooks
All playbooks live in `setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/ansible/` and require an inventory of enrolled IPA clients.
### Deploy Package Auto-Installer
```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-install.yml
```
Deploys `ansipa-install-packages.sh` + a systemd timer (every 30 min). The script queries IPA for host groups named `ansipa-install-<package>` and installs or removes packages to match.
**Group naming convention:** `ansipa-install-firefox` → installs `firefox`.
### Deploy Module Auto-Installer
```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-modules.yml \
[-e ansipa_user=amir]
```
Deploys `ansipa-install-modules.sh` + timer. Queries for groups named `ansipa-module-<name>` and runs the matching script from `/usr/local/lib/ansipa-modules/<name>.sh`. Module scripts are copied from `setup/modules/optional-Modules/apps/*.sh`.
Each module is applied once and stamped in `/var/lib/ansipa-modules/<name>.done`.
### Deploy BaseUser Sync
```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-baseuser-sync.yml
```
Deploys a `systemd.path` unit that triggers on login. Users who are members of the IPA `BaseUser` group are automatically added to the local `baseusers` group.
### Deploy Policy Enforcer
```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-policies.yml
```
Deploys the shared policy library, all `policies.d/` modules, `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`, and a systemd timer that runs the enforcer every 30 min.
### Collect LUKS Backup Keys
```bash
ansible-playbook -i inventory collect-luks-keys.yml \
-e luks_smb_server=ipa.corp.example.com \
-e luks_upload_password=<LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD>
```
For each enrolled host:
1. Fetches `/_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY` from the client to a local staging directory.
2. Uploads the staged key to `//ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys/<hostname>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY` via `smbclient` using a temporary credentials file (`no_log`, deleted in `post_tasks`).
3. Removes the local staging copy after a successful upload.
Keys on the SMB share are accessible only to `KeyAdmin` group members (see [SMB Shares](#smb-shares)).
**Schedule automatic collection:**
```bash
# Add to crontab on the Ansible controller
0 3 * * * cd /path/to/FreeipaAnsible/ansible && \
ansible-playbook -i inventory collect-luks-keys.yml \
-e luks_smb_server=ipa.corp.example.com \
-e luks_upload_password=<LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD>
```
---
## Host Group Reference
### Device policies (host groups — applied machine-wide)
| Group prefix | Handled by | Effect |
|--------------|-----------|--------|
| `ansipa-install-<pkg>` | `ansipa-install-packages.sh` | Install/remove native package |
| `ansipa-module-<name>` | `ansipa-install-modules.sh` | Run module script once |
| `fp_install-<app>` | `ansipa-install-flatpaks.sh` | Install Flatpak app |
| `BaseUser` | `auto-add-baseuser.sh` | Add user to local `baseusers` group |
| `policy-daemon-enable-<unit>` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | `systemctl enable --now <unit>`; reverted on leave |
| `policy-daemon-disable-<unit>` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | `systemctl disable --now <unit>`; reverted on leave |
| `dev_timeshift-backup` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Daily Timeshift snapshot at 03:00 |
| `dev_mon_clamscan` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Daily ClamAV + rkhunter + chkrootkit scan at 02:00; result reported to CheckMK (`Ansipa_ClamScan` local check) |
| `dev_no-local-users` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Lock passwords for root and all local users (UID ≥ 1000); reverted on leave |
| `local_sudo_<username>` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Grant `<username>` full sudo on this specific device; reverted on leave |
### User policies (user groups — follow the user across all enrolled devices)
| Group prefix | Handled by | Effect |
|--------------|-----------|--------|
| `usr_block-binary-<name>` | `ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` | Prevent group members from running `<name>` on any enrolled host; use `__` for `.` in Flatpak app IDs |
---
## Policy Enforcement
`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh` runs every 30 minutes on each enrolled client (deployed by `deploy-ansipa-policies.yml`). All policies are idempotent and reversible — leaving a host/user group undoes the policy on the next run.
### Binary Blocking (per user)
`policy-block-binary-<name>` is a FreeIPA **user group**, not a host group. Membership follows the user to every enrolled machine: a blocked user cannot run `<name>` regardless of which device they log into.
The enforcer queries all `policy-block-binary-*` user groups from FreeIPA on every run and installs a **PATH-priority wrapper** in `/usr/local/bin/<name>` for each one. The wrapper checks the caller's group membership at runtime via `id(1)` / SSSD and:
- **blocks** the command if the caller is a group member (exits 1 with a policy message);
- **passes through** to the real binary for all other users (searches native PATH dirs, then falls back to `flatpak run <name>`).
**Flatpak support:** use `__` in place of `.` in the group name. For example, `policy-block-binary-org__gimp__Gimp` blocks the Flatpak `org.gimp.Gimp` for group members while transparently invoking `flatpak run org.gimp.Gimp` for everyone else.
Deleting the IPA user group causes the wrapper to be removed on the next enforcer run. State is tracked in `/var/lib/ansipa-policies/blocked-binaries`.
### Daemon Enable / Disable
| Group | Effect on join | Effect on leave |
|-------|---------------|-----------------|
| `policy-daemon-enable-<unit>` | `systemctl enable --now <unit>` | `systemctl disable --now <unit>` |
| `policy-daemon-disable-<unit>` | `systemctl disable --now <unit>` | `systemctl enable --now <unit>` |
The `.service` suffix is optional — it is appended automatically when the unit name contains no dot, so any systemd unit type works. If a unit appears in both enable and disable groups simultaneously, it is skipped with a warning.
State is tracked in `/var/lib/ansipa-policies/daemon-enabled` and `daemon-disabled` so revert actions are applied correctly when a host leaves a group.
### ClamAV Scan → CheckMK (`dev_mon_clamscan`)
The scan results go straight to CheckMK — there is no SMB share or desktop-notification pipeline.
```
Client (dev_mon_clamscan)
└── cron 02:00: /usr/local/bin/ansipa-clamscan.sh
├── clamscan + rkhunter + chkrootkit → /var/log/ansipa-clamscan.log
└── writes CheckMK local check /usr/lib/check_mk_agent/local/ansipa_clamscan
CheckMK agent (installed by dev_mon_base)
└── collects the ansipa_clamscan local check on each poll
└── surfaces the "Ansipa_ClamScan" service:
OK = clean · WARN = stale DB / rkhunter warnings · CRIT = infected
```
**Prerequisites:**
- Add the host to `dev_mod_anti-malware` (installs ClamAV, rkhunter, chkrootkit).
- Add the host to `dev_mon_base` (installs the CheckMK agent that collects the check).
- Add the host to `dev_mon_clamscan` (runs the scan + emits the check).
Leaving `dev_mon_clamscan` removes the cron, scan script, log, and local check on the next enforcer run.
### Proxmox Infra Monitoring (PVE / PBS) → CheckMK
The Proxmox VE hypervisor and Proxmox Backup Server are infrastructure
appliances, not FreeIPA clients, so they sit outside the `dev_mon_base`
host-group flow above. Instead, `image/ansipa-infra-checkmk-install.sh`
wires them into the same CheckMK instance directly:
```
ansipa-infra-checkmk-install.sh <CMK_URL> <CMK_SITE> <CMK_SECRET> [HOST_FQDN] [CMK_USER]
```
Run as root on the PVE or PBS host itself (copy the `image/` directory over
first, or `scp` just the three files). The script:
- auto-detects the role (`pveversion` → PVE, `proxmox-backup-manager` → PBS),
- installs the CheckMK agent (`.deb`, falling back to the shell agent),
- drops the matching local check into `/usr/lib/check_mk_agent/local/`,
- registers `cmk-agent-ctl` push mode if available (useful behind NAT),
- registers the host in CheckMK under folder `/ansipa/infra` and triggers
service discovery + activate-changes.
It is idempotent — safe to re-run after a secret rotation or hostname change.
**`ansipa_pve`** (`image/ansipa-pve-monitor.sh`) reports, via `pvesh`:
`Ansipa_PVE_Cluster` (quorum/standalone), `Ansipa_PVE_Storage` (worst
utilisation across node storages), `Ansipa_PVE_Guests` (VM/CT running vs
stopped counts), `Ansipa_PVE_Backup` (freshness + outcome of the last
vzdump job).
**`ansipa_pbs`** (`image/ansipa-pbs-monitor.sh`) reports, via
`proxmox-backup-manager`: `Ansipa_PBS_Datastores` (worst datastore disk
usage via `df`), `Ansipa_PBS_LastBackup` (freshness + outcome of the last
backup task), `Ansipa_PBS_TaskFailures` (any failed GC/verify/sync/prune/
backup task in the last 24h).
Both scripts have no dependency beyond the Proxmox CLI tooling itself (no
`jq`/`python3` required) and degrade a given service to CheckMK state 3
(UNKNOWN) rather than failing outright when a command is unavailable. CPU/
RAM/root-disk are already covered by CheckMK's stock Linux checks, so they
aren't duplicated here.
### Local User Lockdown
Adding a host to the `no_local_users` group locks the password of every local account — root (UID 0) and all regular users (UID ≥ 1000) — using `passwd -l`. Accounts whose passwords are already locked (`!` or `*` prefix in shadow) are left untouched and are not tracked.
State is persisted in `/var/lib/ansipa-policies/no-local-users` (one username per line). Only accounts that were actively unlocked at apply time are written to this file, so the revert step only unlocks what was changed.
| Action | Effect |
|--------|--------|
| Join `no_local_users` | `passwd -l` on root + all UID ≥ 1000 local accounts |
| Leave `no_local_users` | `passwd -u` on every account listed in the state file |
**Interaction with FreeIPA sudo:** Domain accounts in the `sudoers` or `sudo-nopasswd` FreeIPA groups retain full sudo access via SSSD — local password lockdown does not affect them. Ensure at least one domain admin has sudo before adding a host to this group.
### Per-device sudo grants
`local_sudo_<username>` is a **host group** that grants a specific user full sudo on that particular machine, independently of FreeIPA-wide sudo rules. This is useful for giving a user admin rights on their own workstation while keeping them unprivileged on shared servers.
| Action | Effect |
|--------|--------|
| Join `local_sudo_alice` | Creates `/etc/sudoers.d/ansipa-local-sudo-alice` with `alice ALL=(ALL) ALL` |
| Leave `local_sudo_alice` | Removes the drop-in on the next enforcer run |
State is tracked in `/var/lib/ansipa-policies/local-sudo-users`. Drop-ins are mode `0440` and validated by `visudo` syntax rules automatically.
---
## LUKS Key Flow
```
Install time (arch-autoinstall.sh or archbaseos-guided-install.sh)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1. User sets primary LUKS passphrase interactively
2. 64-byte random key generated from /dev/urandom
3. Key enrolled in second LUKS slot
4. Key written to /_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY (mode 0400, root-only)
inside the encrypted Btrfs volume
Post-install (Ansible controller)
──────────────────────────────────
5. collect-luks-keys.yml runs
6. Fetches /_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY from each client (become: yes)
7. Uploads to //ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys/<host>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY
as 'luks-upload' service account (write-only, no_log)
8. Local staging copy deleted after successful upload
Recovery (KeyAdmin member)
───────────────────────────
9. Connect to //ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys with a KeyAdmin Samba account
10. Retrieve <host>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY and use with cryptsetup
```
The backup key lives inside the encrypted partition and is only accessible when the disk is already unlocked. Its purpose is to allow an admin to unlock the disk for recovery without knowing the user's passphrase.
---
## Keycloak
`keycloak-configure.sh` performs the initial wiring after both FreeIPA and Keycloak containers are healthy:
1. Creates the configured realm in Keycloak.
2. Sets up an LDAP federation pointing at the FreeIPA LDAP/LDAPS endpoint.
3. Configures user and group mappers.
Run it once after the first `docker compose up`:
```bash
cd setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/image
./keycloak-configure.sh
```
The Keycloak admin console is available at `http://<KC_HOSTNAME>:8080` (dev mode) or `https://<KC_HOSTNAME>:8443` (requires TLS cert for production `start` command).
---
## Auto Enrollment + Ansible
```bash
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/auto-enroll-ansible.sh
```
Combines FreeIPA client enrollment and Ansible deployment in one shot. Useful for provisioning scripts that run on first boot.
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