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FreeIPA & Ansible

The FreeIPA/Ansible system ("ansipa") provides centralised identity management for a mixed Linux fleet (Arch, Fedora, RHEL/Rocky/AlmaLinux, Debian/Ubuntu): single sign-on, host-group-driven package and module deployment, policy enforcement, CheckMK monitoring, LUKS backup key collection, scan-result aggregation, and automatic Keycloak configuration. For a full deployment walkthrough — ports, the nginx portal/reverse proxy, firewall rules, NAT behaviour, and Proxmox LXC — see the ansipa Setup Guide.

All relevant files live under setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/.

Architecture

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  FreeIPA + Keycloak + Samba container (docker-compose)               │
│                                                                      │
│  • FreeIPA — user/host directory, Kerberos KDC, DNS (optional)       │
│  • Keycloak — OIDC provider federating FreeIPA via LDAP              │
│  • CheckMK — fleet monitoring (agent + local checks)                 │
│  • Samba — SMB shares for the policy store and LUKS backup keys      │
└───────────┬─────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┘
            │ SSSD / Kerberos         │ SMB (445)
            ▼                         ▼
┌──────────────────────┐    ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Enrolled client     │    │  Ansible controller                     │
│                      │    │                                         │
│  • sssd              │    │  • deploy-ansipa-*.yml playbooks        │
│  • ipa CLI           │    │  • collect-luks-keys.yml                │
│  • CheckMK agent     │    │    (uploads keys to ansipa-luks-keys    │
│  • Ansible-deployed  │    │     share as luks-upload service acct)  │
│    timers:           │    └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
│    ├── pkg installer │
│    ├── module install│
│    ├── Flatpak install
│    ├── baseuser sync │
│    └── policy enforcer (every 30 min)
│        ├── binary blocking
│        ├── daemon enable/disable
│        ├── Timeshift backups
│        └── dev_mon_clamscan → CheckMK
└──────────────────────┘

FreeIPA Server Container

Quick Start

cd setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/image
cp .env.example .env
$EDITOR .env                        # set all required variables
docker compose up -d
docker compose logs -f freeipa      # watch first-boot (~10 min)
# Once freeipa is healthy:
./keycloak-configure.sh             # wire Keycloak → FreeIPA LDAP

To run FreeIPA without Keycloak:

docker compose up -d freeipa

Environment Variables (`.env`)

Variable	Required	Description
`IPA_HOSTNAME`	yes	FQDN of the IPA server (e.g. `ipa.corp.example.com`)
`IPA_DOMAIN`	yes	DNS domain (e.g. `corp.example.com`)
`IPA_REALM`	—	Kerberos realm; defaults to `IPA_DOMAIN` uppercased
`IPA_ADMIN_PASSWORD`	yes	`admin` account password
`IPA_DM_PASSWORD`	yes	Directory Manager password
`IPA_SETUP_DNS`	—	`true` to enable integrated DNS (default `false`)
`IPA_DNS_FORWARDER`	—	Upstream DNS when `IPA_SETUP_DNS=true`
`IPA_SETUP_KRA`	—	`true` to enable the Key Recovery Authority
`LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD`	yes	Password for the `luks-upload` Samba service account
`KC_HOSTNAME`	yes	Public hostname of Keycloak
`KC_REALM`	—	Keycloak realm name (default `corp`)
`KC_ADMIN`	—	Keycloak admin username (default `admin`)
`KC_ADMIN_PASSWORD`	yes	Keycloak admin password
`KC_DB_PASSWORD`	yes	PostgreSQL password for Keycloak
`IPA_BIND_DN`	—	LDAP bind DN for Keycloak federation (default: Directory Manager)
`IPA_BIND_PASSWORD`	—	LDAP bind password; leave blank to reuse `IPA_DM_PASSWORD`
`IPA_USE_LDAPS`	—	`true` to use LDAPS for Keycloak federation

Exposed Ports

Port	Protocol	Service
389	TCP	LDAP
636	TCP	LDAPS
88	TCP + UDP	Kerberos
464	TCP + UDP	kpasswd
443	TCP	HTTPS (IPA web UI)
445	TCP	SMB (Samba shares)
139	TCP	NetBIOS session (Samba)
137	UDP	NetBIOS name service
138	UDP	NetBIOS datagram
8080	TCP	Keycloak HTTP
8443	TCP	Keycloak HTTPS
8090	TCP	CheckMK web UI (container :5000)
8000	TCP	CheckMK agent receiver (push mode)
6557	TCP	CheckMK livestatus (optional)
8088	TCP	nginx gateway — portal + reverse proxy for all UIs

For a full deployment walkthrough — the nginx portal, exposing ansipa behind your own reverse proxy, and NAT/push-mode behaviour — see the ansipa Setup Guide.

Container Internals

On first start, ipa-first-boot.service runs ipa-first-boot.sh to initialise the FreeIPA instance. On every start, ansipa-smb.service runs ansipa-smb-setup.sh to configure Samba (the container rootfs is ephemeral — Samba config and users must be re-applied after restarts).

Data persisted to the /data volume:

/data/
├── samba/
│   ├── passdb.tdb          # Samba password database (survives restarts)
│   └── ansipa-smb.env      # Persisted service passwords (auto-written on first start)
├── policy-store/           # Policy files, edited live via the ansipa-policystore share
└── luks-keys/              # LUKS backup keys (written by Ansible controller via SMB)

SMB Shares

The container exposes two Samba shares (ansipa-luks-keys and ansipa-policystore), configured by ansipa-smb-setup.sh.

ClamAV scan results are no longer delivered over SMB. The dev_mon_clamscan policy now reports them to CheckMK via a local check (Ansipa_ClamScan), so there is no ansipa-scans share or scanupload account any more.

`ansipa-luks-keys` — LUKS Backup Key Store

Path: /data/luks-keys
Permissions: write-only for luks-upload; read-only for members of the KeyAdmin Linux group
Purpose: The Ansible controller writes each host's LUKS backup key here after collecting it via collect-luks-keys.yml.
Access control: Add an admin Samba user to the KeyAdmin group on the container:
```
# On the freeipa container
useradd -r -G KeyAdmin <username>
smbpasswd -a <username>
```
The KeyAdmin group and the luks-upload service account are created by ansipa-smb-setup.sh on every container start.

Client Enrollment

freeipa-enroll.sh supports Arch, Fedora, RHEL/Rocky/AlmaLinux, and Debian/Ubuntu — it auto-detects the distro and uses the right package manager and package names. On Arch, ipa-client-install comes from the AUR freeipa-client package; the enroll script first builds the bundled autofs-pkgbuild/ (the stock AUR autofs is currently broken — its pinned tarball 404s), so expect the first Arch enrollment to take a while as the AUR FreeIPA suite compiles. See the ansipa Setup Guide for details.

Via Installer Module

Select freeipa-client during tui-install.sh or install-modules.sh.

Manual Enrollment

Three modes:

# Answerfile mode (unattended)
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh \
    --answerfile setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client-answerfile.json

# Interactive prompts
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh --interactive

# Direct flag passthrough to freeipa-enroll.sh
bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/freeipa-client.sh \
    --domain freeipa.example.com \
    --server ipa.example.com \
    --principal admin

Client Answerfile Schema

{
  "domain":      "freeipa.abdelbaki.eu",
  "realm":       "FREEIPA.ABDELBAKI.EU",
  "server":      "freeipa.abdelbaki.eu",
  "hostname":    "",
  "principal":   "admin",
  "password":    "",
  "mkhomedir":   true,
  "sudo":        true,
  "dns_update":  true,
  "ntp_server":  "",
  "fido2":       false,
  "fido2_users": []
}

Leave hostname blank to use the current machine hostname. Leave password blank to be prompted at enrollment time.

Ansible Playbooks

All playbooks live in setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/ansible/ and require an inventory of enrolled IPA clients.

Deploy Package Auto-Installer

ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-install.yml

Deploys ansipa-install-packages.sh + a systemd timer (every 30 min). The script queries IPA for host groups named ansipa-install-<package> and installs or removes packages to match.

Group naming convention: ansipa-install-firefox → installs firefox.

Deploy Module Auto-Installer

ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-modules.yml \
    [-e ansipa_user=amir]

Deploys ansipa-install-modules.sh + timer. Queries for groups named ansipa-module-<name> and runs the matching script from /usr/local/lib/ansipa-modules/<name>.sh. Module scripts are copied from setup/modules/optional-Modules/apps/*.sh.

Each module is applied once and stamped in /var/lib/ansipa-modules/<name>.done.

Deploy BaseUser Sync

ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-baseuser-sync.yml

Deploys a systemd.path unit that triggers on login. Users who are members of the IPA BaseUser group are automatically added to the local baseusers group.

Deploy Policy Enforcer

ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-policies.yml

Deploys the shared policy library, all policies.d/ modules, ansipa-enforce-policies.sh, and a systemd timer that runs the enforcer every 30 min. Installs the Ansible-deployed fallback copy of policies.d/ — see Git-Based Policy Distribution for the live, signed update path that supersedes it.

Deploy Signed Git-Based Policy Puller

ansible-playbook -i inventory deploy-ansipa-git-pull.yml \
    -e ansipa_git_host=ipa.corp.example.com -e ansipa_git_port=2222 \
    -e @vault-ansipa-git-pull.yml   # ansipa_git_host_key, ansipa_git_deploy_key, ansipa_gpg_pubkey

Run this after deploy-ansipa-policies.yml. Bootstraps the unprivileged _ansipa puller account, pins the git server's SSH host key, installs this node's read-only deploy key and the operator's GPG public key, clones the bare mirror, and installs ansipa-pull-apply.sh + a systemd timer (10 min, ±90s jitter) plus a sudoers drop-in scoped to one exact command. See Git-Based Policy Distribution below.

Collect LUKS Backup Keys

ansible-playbook -i inventory collect-luks-keys.yml \
    -e luks_smb_server=ipa.corp.example.com \
    -e luks_upload_password=<LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD>

For each enrolled host:

Fetches /_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY from the client to a local staging directory.
Uploads the staged key to //ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys/<hostname>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY via smbclient using a temporary credentials file (no_log, deleted in post_tasks).
Removes the local staging copy after a successful upload.

Keys on the SMB share are accessible only to KeyAdmin group members (see SMB Shares).

Schedule automatic collection:

# Add to crontab on the Ansible controller
0 3 * * * cd /path/to/FreeipaAnsible/ansible && \
    ansible-playbook -i inventory collect-luks-keys.yml \
    -e luks_smb_server=ipa.corp.example.com \
    -e luks_upload_password=<LUKS_KEY_UPLOAD_PASSWORD>

Git-Based Policy Distribution

The old distribution path — an enforcer running as root, blind-syncing whatever .sh files sat on the ansipa-policystore SMB share and source-ing them with no integrity check — is gone. Policy content now reaches a node only via a GPG-signed git commit, verified before anything derived from it runs as root.

Goal: nodes pull on a timer; a pull failure (git server/network unreachable) is a no-op — the node keeps running its last-known-good, already-verified policy indefinitely. Rollback/replay of an old-but-validly- signed commit is detected and refused. No persistent, executable copy of policy scripts sits on disk between runs.

Components

Piece	Where	Runs as
`ansipa-git-server-setup.sh` / `ansipa-git-sshd.service`	FreeIPA container (`image/`)	root (container)
`ansipa-policy.git` (bare repo)	`/data/git-server/repo/` on the container, persisted	owned by `git`
`ansipa-pull-apply.sh` / `ansipa-pull.timer`	every enrolled client (`ansible/`)	`_ansipa` (unprivileged)
`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`	every enrolled client	root, via one scoped `sudo` command

Git server — rolled into the same ANSIPA container as everything else ("own service, own attack surface" means logically separate, not a separate LXC): a dedicated system user git with shell git-shell (git-upload-pack/git-receive-pack only, no interactive shell even if a key leaks), and its own sshd instance on a distinct port (ANSIPA_GIT_SSH_PORT, default 2222) with PasswordAuthentication no. The admin/authoring key gets full push access (restricted only by git-shell); per-node read-only deploy keys are additionally forced to git-upload-pack <repo> via command= in authorized_keys (defense in depth — GPG signing is the real trust boundary regardless). Register a node's deploy key with:

docker exec freeipa ansipa-git-add-deploy-key.sh "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...== node.example.com"

Commit signing — every commit must be GPG-signed on the authoring machine (git config commit.gpgsign true); a pre-receive hook on the server (git verify-commit on every incoming commit) rejects unsigned or badly-signed pushes as defense in depth. The signing private key never leaves the authoring machine — only the public key (ANSIPA_GIT_SIGNING_PUBKEY) is on the container.

Node-side puller (ansipa-pull-apply.sh, run by _ansipa via ansipa-pull.timer) — each run:

git fetch the mirror. Failure here (server/network down) is the designed no-op path — exit, last-applied policy keeps running.
git verify-commit the new HEAD. Failure → hard refusal + alert, nothing executed.
git merge-base --is-ancestor <last-applied> <new-head> — refuses anything that isn't a fast-forward (blocks rollback/replay of an old-but-validly-signed commit).
Materializes the verified tree into a fresh tmpfs workdir (/run/ansipa/current), normalizing permissions (no setuid, no unexpected modes) since git doesn't track real ownership/setuid bits. Wiped before use and unconditionally wiped after via trap ... EXIT — executable policy content exists on disk only for the duration of one run.
Hands off to root via one exact, argument-free sudo command (/etc/sudoers.d/ansipa-git-pull): sudo -n /usr/local/bin/ansipa-enforce-policies.sh. A compromised _ansipa account cannot pivot to arbitrary root execution — it can only trigger the enforcer, which only does what the already-verified commit told it to.
Only on a successful apply does /var/lib/ansipa/last-applied-commit advance, so a failed apply doesn't get silently skipped next time.

lib/ansipa-policy.sh resolves POLICY_DIR to /run/ansipa/current/policies.d when the puller has populated it (the live, verified source), falling back to the Ansible-deployed /usr/local/lib/ansipa/policies.d baseline otherwise — there is no third, unverified source. usr_smb_adm_policystore (the ~/policystore SMB mount) still exists as an editing convenience only: changes made there take effect only once committed, signed, and pushed.

Bootstrap order

image/ansipa-git-server-setup.sh runs automatically on the FreeIPA container (ansipa-git-server-setup.service + ansipa-git-sshd.service); set ANSIPA_GIT_ADMIN_PUBKEY / ANSIPA_GIT_SIGNING_PUBKEY in .env first.
Fetch and verify out of band the container's git-sshd host key (ssh-keyscan -p 2222 <host> alone is not verification — confirm the fingerprint through a separate channel).
ansible-playbook deploy-ansipa-policies.yml (baseline enforcer + fallback policies).
ansible-playbook deploy-ansipa-git-pull.yml with the pinned host key, this node's deploy private key, and the operator's GPG public key (vault these).
Register the node's deploy key on the server: ansipa-git-add-deploy-key.sh.
Author policy changes on a git-signing-capable machine, commit with commit.gpgsign=true, push to git@<host>:ansipa-policy.git — it propagates fleet-wide within one ansipa-pull.timer tick.

Host Group Reference

Device policies (host groups — applied machine-wide)

Group prefix	Handled by	Effect
`ansipa-install-<pkg>`	`ansipa-install-packages.sh`	Install/remove native package
`ansipa-module-<name>`	`ansipa-install-modules.sh`	Run module script once
`fp_install-<app>`	`ansipa-install-flatpaks.sh`	Install Flatpak app
`BaseUser`	`auto-add-baseuser.sh`	Add user to local `baseusers` group
`policy-daemon-enable-<unit>`	`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`	`systemctl enable --now <unit>`; reverted on leave
`policy-daemon-disable-<unit>`	`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`	`systemctl disable --now <unit>`; reverted on leave
`dev_timeshift-backup`	`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`	Daily Timeshift snapshot at 03:00
`dev_mon_clamscan`	`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`	Daily ClamAV + rkhunter + chkrootkit scan at 02:00; result reported to CheckMK (`Ansipa_ClamScan` local check)
`dev_no-local-users`	`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`	Lock passwords for root and all local users (UID ≥ 1000); reverted on leave
`local_sudo_<username>`	`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`	Grant `<username>` full sudo on this specific device; reverted on leave

User policies (user groups — follow the user across all enrolled devices)

Group prefix	Handled by	Effect
`usr_block-binary-<name>`	`ansipa-enforce-policies.sh`	Prevent group members from running `<name>` on any enrolled host; use `__` for `.` in Flatpak app IDs

Policy Enforcement

ansipa-enforce-policies.sh runs every 30 minutes on each enrolled client (deployed by deploy-ansipa-policies.yml). All policies are idempotent and reversible — leaving a host/user group undoes the policy on the next run.

Binary Blocking (per user)

policy-block-binary-<name> is a FreeIPA user group, not a host group. Membership follows the user to every enrolled machine: a blocked user cannot run <name> regardless of which device they log into.

The enforcer queries all policy-block-binary-* user groups from FreeIPA on every run and installs a PATH-priority wrapper in /usr/local/bin/<name> for each one. The wrapper checks the caller's group membership at runtime via id(1) / SSSD and:

blocks the command if the caller is a group member (exits 1 with a policy message);
passes through to the real binary for all other users (searches native PATH dirs, then falls back to flatpak run <name>).

Flatpak support: use __ in place of . in the group name. For example, policy-block-binary-org__gimp__Gimp blocks the Flatpak org.gimp.Gimp for group members while transparently invoking flatpak run org.gimp.Gimp for everyone else.

Deleting the IPA user group causes the wrapper to be removed on the next enforcer run. State is tracked in /var/lib/ansipa-policies/blocked-binaries.

Daemon Enable / Disable

Group	Effect on join	Effect on leave
`policy-daemon-enable-<unit>`	`systemctl enable --now <unit>`	`systemctl disable --now <unit>`
`policy-daemon-disable-<unit>`	`systemctl disable --now <unit>`	`systemctl enable --now <unit>`

The .service suffix is optional — it is appended automatically when the unit name contains no dot, so any systemd unit type works. If a unit appears in both enable and disable groups simultaneously, it is skipped with a warning.

State is tracked in /var/lib/ansipa-policies/daemon-enabled and daemon-disabled so revert actions are applied correctly when a host leaves a group.

ClamAV Scan → CheckMK (`dev_mon_clamscan`)

The scan results go straight to CheckMK — there is no SMB share or desktop-notification pipeline.

Client (dev_mon_clamscan)
  └── cron 02:00: /usr/local/bin/ansipa-clamscan.sh
       ├── clamscan + rkhunter + chkrootkit → /var/log/ansipa-clamscan.log
       └── writes CheckMK local check /usr/lib/check_mk_agent/local/ansipa_clamscan

CheckMK agent (installed by dev_mon_base)
  └── collects the ansipa_clamscan local check on each poll
       └── surfaces the "Ansipa_ClamScan" service:
            OK = clean · WARN = stale DB / rkhunter warnings · CRIT = infected

Prerequisites:

Add the host to dev_mod_anti-malware (installs ClamAV, rkhunter, chkrootkit).
Add the host to dev_mon_base (installs the CheckMK agent that collects the check).
Add the host to dev_mon_clamscan (runs the scan + emits the check).

Leaving dev_mon_clamscan removes the cron, scan script, log, and local check on the next enforcer run.

Proxmox Infra Monitoring (PVE / PBS) → CheckMK

The Proxmox VE hypervisor and Proxmox Backup Server are infrastructure appliances, not FreeIPA clients, so they sit outside the dev_mon_base host-group flow above. Instead, image/ansipa-infra-checkmk-install.sh wires them into the same CheckMK instance directly:

ansipa-infra-checkmk-install.sh <CMK_URL> <CMK_SITE> <CMK_SECRET> [HOST_FQDN] [CMK_USER]

Run as root on the PVE or PBS host itself (copy the image/ directory over first, or scp just the three files). The script:

auto-detects the role (pveversion → PVE, proxmox-backup-manager → PBS),
installs the CheckMK agent (.deb, falling back to the shell agent),
drops the matching local check into /usr/lib/check_mk_agent/local/,
registers cmk-agent-ctl push mode if available (useful behind NAT),
registers the host in CheckMK under folder /ansipa/infra and triggers service discovery + activate-changes.

It is idempotent — safe to re-run after a secret rotation or hostname change.

ansipa_pve (image/ansipa-pve-monitor.sh) reports, via pvesh: Ansipa_PVE_Cluster (quorum/standalone), Ansipa_PVE_Storage (worst utilisation across node storages), Ansipa_PVE_Guests (VM/CT running vs stopped counts), Ansipa_PVE_Backup (freshness + outcome of the last vzdump job).

ansipa_pbs (image/ansipa-pbs-monitor.sh) reports, via proxmox-backup-manager: Ansipa_PBS_Datastores (worst datastore disk usage via df), Ansipa_PBS_LastBackup (freshness + outcome of the last backup task), Ansipa_PBS_TaskFailures (any failed GC/verify/sync/prune/ backup task in the last 24h).

Both scripts have no dependency beyond the Proxmox CLI tooling itself (no jq/python3 required) and degrade a given service to CheckMK state 3 (UNKNOWN) rather than failing outright when a command is unavailable. CPU/ RAM/root-disk are already covered by CheckMK's stock Linux checks, so they aren't duplicated here.

Local User Lockdown

Adding a host to the no_local_users group locks the password of every local account — root (UID 0) and all regular users (UID ≥ 1000) — using passwd -l. Accounts whose passwords are already locked (! or * prefix in shadow) are left untouched and are not tracked.

State is persisted in /var/lib/ansipa-policies/no-local-users (one username per line). Only accounts that were actively unlocked at apply time are written to this file, so the revert step only unlocks what was changed.

Action	Effect
Join `no_local_users`	`passwd -l` on root + all UID ≥ 1000 local accounts
Leave `no_local_users`	`passwd -u` on every account listed in the state file

Interaction with FreeIPA sudo: Domain accounts in the sudoers or sudo-nopasswd FreeIPA groups retain full sudo access via SSSD — local password lockdown does not affect them. Ensure at least one domain admin has sudo before adding a host to this group.

Per-device sudo grants

local_sudo_<username> is a host group that grants a specific user full sudo on that particular machine, independently of FreeIPA-wide sudo rules. This is useful for giving a user admin rights on their own workstation while keeping them unprivileged on shared servers.

Action	Effect
Join `local_sudo_alice`	Creates `/etc/sudoers.d/ansipa-local-sudo-alice` with `alice ALL=(ALL) ALL`
Leave `local_sudo_alice`	Removes the drop-in on the next enforcer run

State is tracked in /var/lib/ansipa-policies/local-sudo-users. Drop-ins are mode 0440 and validated by visudo syntax rules automatically.

LUKS Key Flow

  Install time (arch-autoinstall.sh or archbaseos-guided-install.sh)
  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  1. User sets primary LUKS passphrase interactively
  2. 64-byte random key generated from /dev/urandom
  3. Key enrolled in second LUKS slot
  4. Key written to /_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY (mode 0400, root-only)
     inside the encrypted Btrfs volume

  Post-install (Ansible controller)
  ──────────────────────────────────
  5. collect-luks-keys.yml runs
  6. Fetches /_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY from each client (become: yes)
  7. Uploads to //ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys/<host>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY
     as 'luks-upload' service account (write-only, no_log)
  8. Local staging copy deleted after successful upload

  Recovery (KeyAdmin member)
  ───────────────────────────
  9. Connect to //ipa-server/ansipa-luks-keys with a KeyAdmin Samba account
  10. Retrieve <host>_LUKS_BACKUP_KEY and use with cryptsetup

The backup key lives inside the encrypted partition and is only accessible when the disk is already unlocked. Its purpose is to allow an admin to unlock the disk for recovery without knowing the user's passphrase.

Keycloak

keycloak-configure.sh performs the initial wiring after both FreeIPA and Keycloak containers are healthy:

Creates the configured realm in Keycloak.
Sets up an LDAP federation pointing at the FreeIPA LDAP/LDAPS endpoint.
Configures user and group mappers.

Run it once after the first docker compose up:

cd setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/image
./keycloak-configure.sh

The Keycloak admin console is available at http://<KC_HOSTNAME>:8080 (dev mode) or https://<KC_HOSTNAME>:8443 (requires TLS cert for production start command).

Auto Enrollment + Ansible

bash setup/modules/FreeipaAnsible/auto-enroll-ansible.sh

Combines FreeIPA client enrollment and Ansible deployment in one shot. Useful for provisioning scripts that run on first boot.

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